By Jilcha Hamid

(Read Parts One, Two , Three  & Four )

Lying under the shade on the patio, out of reach of the blazing sun. This was my favourite hang out spot. And there was no better way to pass the time than to mess with people. “If there was a free election in this country, who would win?” I asked.

“…Oromos” they answered with caution.

“Nope.” I replied. At this point they looked puzzled and wondered if they said too much. “The flies would win…the flies are everywhere!” lol

My average day would consist of waking up for the morning prayer, going back to sleep, waking up again, eating breakfast, then stopping by the neighbourhood convenience store to say hello before venturing out to town. The main mode of transportation in Dirre Dhawa was the minicab or “baajaaj” as it’s called. Few people had vehicles. It was cheaper to build a large house than it was to buy a car due to the insanely high import taxes. But the baajaaj was an efficient mode of transportation for the population. A little vehicle which can hold up to 3 passengers (2 in the back, 1 in the front) for a coin or two it’ll take you to your destination. Even to travel a block or two, people would stand on the side of the road and wave for the minicab “aboo baajaaj!”. Hop inside and you were off. In the neighbourhoods there was Dirre Dhawa’s classical, romantic baala gaarii (horse and carriage). There was no point riding the baala gaarii. Unless you were travelling with a lady, then it would be a gentleman thing to do. Or with the elderly. But as far as efficiency was concerned, you can walk just as fast as the horse can pull three people and a carriage. Many of the horses are also underfed and abused. Sometimes you would find abused horses lying dead on the street, abandoned by their owners. Pulling the cart back and forth in the heat without being fed, it was only a matter of time. I didn’t really dig that. So yeah, I’d rather walk the few blocks.

I’d stop by the internet café and check my email and facebook. I’d do that until the internet speed annoyed me and I gave up and left. Sometimes I’d head to the market, the largest one being Taiwan. This is where I learned how to bargain. I got into the habit low balling (offering lower than what was being asked) and negotiating after my little nephew clowned on me once for paying the original price for an item.

“How much did you get it for?” my nephew asked, sniffing out my street smarts.

“A hundred..”

“Wallaaaaaaay?” he replied in a mockingly sarcastic tone. “So you just paid what they asked? I could go to the market right now and negotiate it down to half that price, what do you have to say about that!?” lol I was getting clowned by a kid. I had to get it together.

I’d take the item and ask the price. They’d tell me the price, and I’d give the shopkeeper a ridiculous lowballing price.

“How much are these sun glasses?”

“50 birr..”

“Here’s 20, take it..”

The shopkeeper would take back the item in disgust. Then I’d start raising the offer until they came around. I learned from my cousin. I’ll call him by the nickname “Murataa”. Murataa loved bargaining; even if he wasn’t gonna buy the item. On one occasion when we were in the countryside he walked up to a group of Issa nomads and began making lowball offers for a sheep that he wasn’t even gonna buy lol. He just liked messing with people.

Anyways I’d make my way back home, take a nice cool shower before prayer. This was the perfect time to shower, because that’s when you needed to cool off the most. Did I mention it was hot?

The rest of the day went like this… lunch time, followed by barcaa time. Pick the barcaa spot, sit back and relax. That was life. 7 days a week. City life atleast. It was time to check out the countryside.

Cedric Barnes| Crisis Group| January 24, 2013

On Monday 21 January, a number of unofficial sources reported that 100 or so soldiers had invaded Eritrea’s Ministry of Information and taken over state-owned Eri-TV. During their occupation, the soldiers began broadcasting a statement demanding the implementation of the constitution — never enacted by Parliament — and the release of thousands of political prisoners, including a number of high-profile journalists, and former ministers, senior military officers and officials known as the “G15”, before the station went off air. The rest of the armed forces were described as “quiet”, as was the city, and no shots were fired either in the taking or surrender of the Ministry.

It is hard to tell what exactly happened, or why. News from Asmara is opaque at the best of times, and this apparent military-led protest — or “small incident” as the Eritrean government is terming it — is the latest in a number of informally reported developments, only a few substantiated, suggesting cracks in the unusually regimented state. Since there are no accredited independent journalists in Eritrea, the only alternative to government media is diaspora-driven opposition news websites. These can be illuminating, because Eritrea is a curiously intimate place, with members of the same family occupying top government positions while their close relatives are vocal anti-government activists abroad.

What has emerged was that 2012 was a remarkably newsworthy year for the usually unnoticed county. It began with Ethiopia and Eritrea trading accusations after foreign tourists were attacked and five killed by Ethiopian rebel groups in the Afar region, which is close to the border between the two states. Addis claimed the rebels were under Eritrean direction, justifying Ethiopian reprisals in March against rebel camps across the border. Further incursions were reported in late May — just after Eritrean Independence day — with Ethiopian troops apparently occupying new positions inside Asmara’s territory. Eritrean forces, surprisingly and perhaps ominously for their government, put up little resistance.

From late March until late April, the normally omnipresent Eritrean President Isaias Afkwerki was absent from public life, prompting speculation he was sick, even dead. When he reappeared, little explanation was given, and he looked in good health at Independence Day celebrations. Coincidentally a few months after Isaias resurfaced, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi disappeared from public life; his death was announced on 21 August.

Meles’s death was studiously underplayed by the Eritrean government, though it was a topic of anxious speculation among the population at large, who were concerned about a change in Ethiopian policy — Meles was popularly perceived as less hawkish towards Eritrea.  At that time information emerged that the Eritrean government was arming civilians — many of whom have basic military training — apparently unconcerned that weapons might be later turned against the government.

By the latter half of 2012, more rumours were circulating of discord in the government about the state and direction of the country and the ups and downs of high-profile ministers and military commanders, variously perceived as pro-reform or rivals to the president. Indicative of declining morale, in early October, two air force pilots absconded with the presidential plane toSaudi Arabia, claimed asylum, and made a statement critical of their head of state. But this was just one, albeit dramatic example, of the tens of thousands of other Eritreans who fled during the year. The last unconfirmed rumour in November was that the stalwart Minister of Information, Ali Abdu, had also disappeared.

What does the latest incident signify?

It ended peacefully, at least so it seemed. The protesting soldiers were transported to the outskirts of Asmara, their fate so far unknown. Web-based reports claim that the government is talking to the protest leader, Colonel Saleh Osman, a veteran of the liberation war and respected serving officer reputed to have refused orders to withdraw from the city of Assab during the 1998-2000 border war with Ethiopia– a last stand that, many Eritreans believe, pushed Ethiopia to agree to a peace deal.

Some sources claim that with the TV protest, Saleh was simply demanding political reform. But others suggest that this is a well-orchestrated warning by senior military figures who stand to lose from political and economic reform that the ruling People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) has been mooting for the past year. Either way, partisan analysis dominates.

While not a coup, or even a mutiny, this highly unusual behaviour by Eritrea’s troops, is still significant. The last major protest by “veteran” fighters was in 1993, and this incident comes in the 20th anniversary year of Eritrea’s formal independence. Of course, the Eritrean calendar starts in September, so we are already well into what seems to be a momentous though uncertain year for Eritrea.

By Afendi Muteki 

The three tribes of the Harar Oromo are devided to clans called ‘gosaa’. Many aspects of the family life and social activities of the people were influenced by clan based institutions. Currently, this phenomenon is very strong in the countryside where people’s tradition and customs are highly observed.

The Ittu Oromo is devided to ten clans; Baabbo, Alga, Waayye, Wacaale, Addaayyo, Arroojjii, Baaye, Gaamo, Gaadullaa and Qaalluu. The Afran Qallo Oromo has four clans called Oborraa, Baabbile, Daga and Ala (It is wrong to count Nole and Jarso as two of the four clans that make up the Afran Qallo as many writers do; both of them are parts of the “Daga” clan). The Anniya Oromo  has six clans grouped under two confederacies, called Saddacha and Kudhulle.

Each clan is devided to sub-clans called “ibidda”. This ”ibidda” inturn is divided to kinship groups called “warra”. It is this ”warra” that denotes common origin of peoples and usually, each “warra” is called by a personal name which is regarded as the name of the ancestor of the “warra”. Most of the Oromos of Harerghe are able to count down their forefathers up to the man they consider as their bearing father (i.e. the ancestor of ”warra”).

A person who belongs to the Oromo nation is called ”lammii” (citizen). It is possible to be “lammii” in two ways: by birth and by adoption. Anyone who was born to the Oromo parents would be a “lammi” directly, and such a person is usually called ”ilma gudeedaa” (”a child from the womb”).

Adoption was practiced in three ways.

1. ”ilma guddisaa”: indicates the children that lost their parents at a battle field and adopted to the Oromo citizen. The person adopted in this way had full political and civil rights.
2. ”ilma mixii”: children who are thrown by their bearer on the road and public places and adopted to an Oromo citizen. ‘Ilma mixii’ also had full potitical and civil rights.
3. ”ilma gosaa”/”ilma barcumaa”: this indicates aged persons who became Oromo citizens due to their service to the society and their extra ordinary skills (the Ittu Oromo say “ilma gosaa”, the Afran Qallo Oromo say “ilma barcumaa”). ”Ilma gosaa” had no right to be elected in the state, but he can elect the leaders of the state and members of “caffee” assembly.

A person who was adopted to an Oromo citizen must  practice an Oromo culture; he should speak Afan Oromo and should had due respect for the society’s norms and ethical codes.

It was also possible to live in the Oromo land without having a “lammii” status. In this regard, however, giving a pleadge to the society and the state was a must. A person who was welcomed by the Oromos in this manner was called “amba” (non-citizen). The “amba” had no right of election, niether he would involve in the political and administrative affairs. He, however, had no duty to give military service.

The photo depicts the northern gate of the Walled City of Harar. It was taken by an Austrian Explorer called F. Paulische in 1888.

By Afendi Muteki

Most of the urban centers of Harerghe are of short ages. Harar is the oldest one in the whole of East and Southern Ethiopia
(In his book written 160 years ago, Sir Richard Burton also claimed that Harar is the only permanent settlement in East Africa). It was the capital of Adal Sultanate up to 1577 and an independent city state (Amirate) from 1648-1887. Harar was the main market place for the Oromos as well as other peoples of East Ethiopa.

Next comes Funyaan Biiraa (Gursum) which is said to be a remnant of a nearby town. Professor Ulrich Braukemper says that it had been a capital of an old time Amirate. Imam Ahmed ibn Ibrahim Al-Ghazi was born at a place called “Hubat” which was near to Funyan Biiraa (as recorded in Fat’hul Habasha, the chronicle of Imam Ahmed ibn Ibrahim).

With the exception of these two towns (Harar and Funyan Biiraa), no urban center is said to be an extant of the medieval age. However, there is a high speculation that the towns called with a prefix “Biyyoo” (such as ”Biyyoo Kharaaba”) are old aged as the Oromos have been calling the long-lived Harar by a name “Biyyoo Adaree” meaning “the city of Adaree” (“biyyoo” is to mean “town” in Mahdi Hamid Muudee’s English-Oromo Dictionary and information I obtained from elderly people).

There is an oral tradition that the town of Balbalettii (in West Harerghe, 25 kms south of Gelemso) have also a long age. But I doubt this information is true because no old time documents mention about it. Rather than Balbaleettii, we can see the names like Gelemso and Hirna in the books and travel accounts of many writers.

As trading activities increased in the Harerghe region, certain important religious and cultural centers started to show some urban features. The spread of Islamic preachers among the Oromos also intensified the urbanization process because these preachers came with new house building and furnishing skills in addition to their religious knowledge  Eventually  important cultural places like Gelemso, Qunnii, Hirna, Watar, Babille etc.. changed to true urban centers.

The last quarter of the 19 century brought the most remarkable effect on the urbanization process in Harerghe. This  happened in two ways. After the defeat of the Oromos by the army of emperor Minilik, many garrisons was established for the administrative purposes and as a living places for the conquering army which had responsibility of watching over the conquered lands. With construction of living houses, churches, water wells etc, these garrisons were transformed to true urban centers. Gurawa, Dadar, Komona, Anchar etc were founded in this way.

The construction of Ethio-Djibouti Railway Line was the other factor that fastend the urbanization process in Harerghe. Dire Dawa, Erar, Mieso, Bikke, Afdam etc.. were the direct results of this process.

The urbanization process in Harerghe hasn’t stoped. More urban centers are coming, and thd old ones are expanding in all direction.

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Afandi Mutaki, a native of  Galamso, is an ethnographer based in the historic  city of Harar . His works can be accessed at http://www.afendimutekiharar.com/

By Afendi Muteki

The urban centers in the Harerghe have shown many changes in the 20^th century; some of them grew continuously, others stayed in dwarfism. Few of them continue to play their historical role while a handful were totally forgotten. This essay tries to assess the ups and downs of the towns of Harerghe in the 20^th century.

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In early 20^th century, Dire Dawa was made the main terminal of the Franco-Ethiopian Railway Line. This has caused commerce to bloom in the area and consequently, many people settled there permanently. European, Arabian and Indian traders also came to the area and introduced new transactions and building styles. Within a decade, it replaced the centuries old Harar as the main commercial center of east Ethiopia (But Harar remained the administrative center).

In the same period, the land of Harerghe was divided to vast woredas (district). The woreda’s chief activity was gathering the tributes and taxes from the native Oromos who became tenants on their land. Due to their strategic positions, some towns situated on the mountain tops like Qun’e (Qunnii) and Gurawa became seats of the newly created woredas. These towns were mostly inhabited by the imperial army and their families. The Oromos living around those woreda towns suffered greatly from the repeated looting undertaken by the army. For example, the people of Gara Mul’ata have a famous saying which reminds us of the situation of the time.

Gurawaa gad-yaatii
Loon nu aati

Meaning
They come out of Gurawa (town)

And they steal our cattle

Ras Tafari Makonen’s ascendance to the Solomonic throne as Emperor Haile-Silasie I of Ethiopia brought another change on the urbanization process. Harerghe was devided to “awraja”s (sub-provinces) and woredas. In the eastern half of Harerghe, towns like Dadar, Gurawa and Funyan Biiraa became awraja centers along with Harar and Dire Dawa. In the western part, Afdam became the capital of Adal and Issa Awraja but Qun’ee (Qunnii) was replaced by the newly founded “Ciroo” town as the capital of “Carcar” awraja. (Ciroo was renamed “Asebe Teferi” in the honor of the emperor, but the Oromos continue to call it by its original name).

The five year Italian occupation of the country brought a new dynamism in the urbanization process in the Harerghe. The occupiers constructed the all weather road that runs from Addis Ababa to Harar and then passes to Jijjiga. This had intensified trade and communication in the area and more urban centers appeared on the Fugug Mountains. The Italian era also favored historical towns to resurrect. For example, Galamso was made the capital of “Carcar” awraja in that period and consequently, it expanded in all directions.

Another thing to note here was the Italian attempt to establish a new urbanized community of immigrants which were thought to be brought from southern Italy. The site selected to host those immigrants was a place called “Waccuu” in Carcar province (20kms East of Galamso). An intensive housing program was launched in the area and dozens of European style buildings were constructed. However, the program was interrupted when the Italians left the country in 1941 yet “Waacuu” became a typical town that represents the five years time (the elderly people still call it “Kinteerii”- derived from the Italian “cantiere” which was to mean “construction site”).

The emperor’s return to the throne turned the development of many urban centers of Harerghe in the other way; Afdem lost it status of awraja capital, Galamso was replaced by “Assebe Teferi” (Ciroo), and Harar’s high expansion stopped. But Dire Dawa continued to play its role as the leading commercial center of the east; “Magaala” became the commercial half of the city and “Kazira” became the residential half.

In the 1950s, Christian missionary groups launched programs of evangelization in the Harerghe. Their effort had little effect on the religious composition of the  Oromos of Harerghe yet they helped found new health facilities and education centers. For example, an American Adventist missionary group established Dadar Hospital which was the first one to be opened outside Harar and Dire Dawa.

The 1950s was also marked by a wide spread of European and Arabian merchants in the Harerghe. Due to the efforts made by these entrepreneurs, electric lighting system and tap water was introduced in many urban centers. However, apart from Harar and Dire Dawa, the imperial government gave low attention on improving the infrastructure and housing conditions in the towns of Harerghe. For example, it was only in the late 1960s and early 1970s that the banking and telephone services were introduced to the towns of Ciroo, Haramaya, Galamso and Dadar.

The coming of the Dergue to power highly favored the towns that had awraja status and some woreda towns; many had got 24 hours electric power, health center, high school etc.. However, trade had diminished due to the regime’s anti-market policies. As a result, contraband engulfed many towns of Harerghe. The Ethio-Somali war of 1977-78 also caused serious damage to the towns of Harerghe. This damage was very great to the towns situated in the former Jijjiga and Gursum awrajas. For example, a town of Qoree (in Gursum) was almost completely destroyed by the war.

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Afandi Mutaki, a native of  Galamso, is an ethnographer based in the historic  city of Harar . His works can be accessed at http://www.afendimutekiharar.com/

Lighten up people!! There is nothing to celebrate about the injunction against the ETV documentary. That is not going to change the reality inside the country’s torture chambers-some of them inherited from the Dergue and some of them new. And nothing will change inside the country’s courts- one of the most important repressive tools in the arsenal of the Ethiopian state. It is probably tempting to think that the Court’s decision to impose an injunction against this intensely expected melodramatic documentary suggests that the court system is not fully integrated. Reaching decisions that are sometimes painful to the system/government is a necessary precondition of strategies of litigation. As technologies of repression, courts cannot manufacture legitimacy without a veneer of neutrality. To the extent possible, the court adheres to the rules and court rituals as rigorously as possible. My favourite author says something like this: “The more elaborate the paraphernalia of authentication, the greater the chance of vicarious popular participation in its conundrums”. In situations like today, there is simply no other way. There is no room for flexibility, no space of manoeuvre. And who is the winner in this game? The system. Period. With or without disguise, one way or another, we have been told these lies several times in the past. The only difference is that the repression is relocated from one group to another- a key strategy of survival for a regime whose life depends on a constant production of crisis. EPRDF sustains itself on crisis. Without continued crisis, EPRDF will sustain a blood clot.

This does not change anything on the ground lest legitimize the regime. The lawyers are doing what they must- offering professional help for their client. They might genuinely believe that this will help protect the defendant’s right to presumption of innocence and justice. But government leaders have been on the record accusing persons that have not yet been convicted.
This does not change anything because the state will still use the confessions tortured out of your committees as evidence in the court of law. The regime will continue to try defendants without the gesture of a trial worthy of its names. It will use its right to determine who lives and who must die to crush their spirit and compel them to submit, as it did with those who come before these committees. The precedent is very clear. People will be accused of the ‘ultimate’ crime, the court will reduce it to ‘high’ crimes, in the process secures some semblance of independence and neutrality, evidence will be manufactured, sometimes extorted through torture (a practice as routine as a “shay buna inibal?”), defendants will be denied the right to sometimes even see let alone contest the evidence, the court will convict, and you will be offered a pardon document that confirms everything the government wanted. In the end, the court will reconstruct reality in the image of the regime. Even if we recognize the process for the sham that it is, there is something about courts that makes them so valuable in technologies of oppression.

In Stalinist USSR, Under the Nazi regime, and in Apartheid South Africa, courts have played an indispensable role in preserving and consolidating those pernicious systems. I am not trying to compare this system for doing so will require some research. But based on a few observations, I can say that Apartheid courts were much more judicial and judicious than their Ethiopian counterparts. In his autobiography, Long Walk to Freedom, Mandela explains the legalistic but yet biopolitically oppressive nature of the white South African society. Authoritarian, racist, undemocratic but yet unusually legalistic! The courts unabashedly enforced racial inequality but this is not tantamount to arbitrary abrogation of constitutional rights. In his autobiography, he writes, “The court system, however, was, perhaps the only place in South Africa where an African could possibly receive a fair hearing and where the rule of law might still apply.”

On the contrary, Ethiopia is a nation constitutionally committed to a multi-ethnic democratic federalism. Its constitution accords human and democratic rights an indispensable place in the constitutional structure. The human rights section of the Constitution is almost a verbatim copy of international human rights instruments. But yet, its judiciary is lacks the perks of independence and neutrality that Apartheid judges enjoyed- i.e., judges legally required to enforce racial inequality. I wonder if there is a single person among those who had the misfortune of facing Ethiopian courts who would give the same testimony as Nelson Mandela did. I will not prejudge history but I highly doubt it.

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UPDATE

In my earlier reflection on the ruling of the injunction issued against ETV’s documentary film, I have expressed concerns about the role of Ethiopian courts as technologies at the disposal of a pernicious oppressive regime. One of the most salient features of a judicial system integrated into the administrative agencies of the state is complete elimination of core normative distinction between administration and adjudication. Within less than two hours of the ruling by a trial chamber, we heard that the President of the High Court has nullified the court’s injunction. This is the penultimate elimination of those distinctions between law, and politics, guilt and innocence, truth and falsehoods that are distinctive feature of authoritarian systems. The trial chamber’s action in issuing an injunction against the broadcasting of a hostile and prejudicial documentary concerning a matter under consideration in court is a judicial act.

The decision of the president to nullify the trial chamber’s ruling as a matter of administrative decision is an administrative act. To nullify a judicial decision with an administrative action is indicative of the kind of rotten, ruined, and ruinous justice administrated by these courts. Here you have the most authentic example of a system that uses the sovereignty of the state, including its court system, as tactical instruments in the elimination of the political foe. This is no justice, it is a railroad operation par excellence. These defendants have already been convicted. The verdict is predetermined. They are not expecting justice, but waiting to be railroaded.

By Alemayehu Fentaw Weldemariam

An authoritarian regime is bad, no matter what its ideological dressing may be. Terrorism is also bad, whether it is Islamic, secular, or so-called state terrorism. While this may be a truism, the EPRDF would argue that neither could nor should be forced on it.

Yesterday, ETV aired on prime time television a documentary prepared by the Information Network Security Agency (INSA) and the Federal Police Anti-Terror Joint Task-Force titled “Jihadawi Harekat” and subtitled “Boko Haram in Ethiopia”, despite an injunction issued by the Federal High Court prohibiting the dissemination of the film. The broadcast took place while the trials of 29 peaceful Muslim protesters, who are accused of terrorism, are pending.

The footage features few facts supported by evidence, except for the confessions of the accused, which, according to their defense attorney, were compelled by force. The central problem with the broadcast is that the defendants, already disadvantaged by coerced confessions, will now face the added hazard of prejudiced public opinion.

It is plainly evident that the defendants will not have a fair trial and that adverse publicity has gutted the principle of the presumption of innocence of the accused.  This raises the additional grave concern – the right to a fair trial with presumption of innocence does not exist in Ethiopia!  This is a classic hallmark of an authoritarian regime.

The Ethiopian constitution and other laws guarantee accused persons the right to fair trial.  Article 20(1) guarantees accused persons “the right to a public trial.” But this constitutional protection is weakened by the lack of pre-trial publicity  jurisprudence and responsible law enforcement, insofar as the absence of both undermine the right to a fair trial in that country.

Constitutional Article 19 (5) stipulates that, “[p]ersons arrested shall not be compelled to make confessions or admissions which could be used in evidence or against them. Any evidence obtained under coercion shall not be admissible.” In addition, Article 20(3) provides that “[d]uring proceedings accused persons have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law and not to be compelled to testify against themselves.

As Ronald Dworkin has argued, the right of an innocent person not to be convicted should be regarded as fundamental.  This is not only a legal harm to the individual, but a moral harm to any society when this is violated. While the purpose and role of the press and media are crucial to democratic governance and an open society, there does exist the real problem of abuse by the media in manufacturing guilt and public censure through influencing public opinion.   This is a deep injustice. The right to a fair trial is founded on a fair criminal process and justice system in order to avoid miscarriages of justice.

The irony is that the injunction issued by the Federal High Court, and secured by the defense attorneys against ETV, was then countermanded by president of the High Court, who does not have that authority.

We are familiar with cases of contempt of court committed by the executive branch.  What is unique in this case, and all the more surprising, is that it was committed by a judge.  Any publicity which creates a substantial risk for the accused, and which undermines the fair application of justice during the proceedings in question, amounts to contempt of court.

What caused the most serious damage to the presumption of innocence protection in this particular case is not so much the act of public opinion, but the public dissemination of inadmissible evidence outside the court. To wit: the coerced confessions of the accused.

The so-called documentary presented no relevant evidence to support the charges of terrorism against the accused.  All it did was connect insignificant dots and trivial facts, instead of providing any earth-shattering discoveries made in advance of the trial through intelligence gathering or investigation. For example, the documentary tells us that one of the accused, Aman Assefa, aka Ismael, used to own and operate a tumble-down juice store around Mercator, which he named “Salafiyya”.  What does that prove?

The documentary also makes the absurd claim that the accused were trained by Jassim Sultan.  The Economist extolled him in such words: “Jassim Sultan, a renowned Qatari intellectual, strikes a chord by rejecting the Brotherhood’s demand for strict obedience from its followers, and derides its slogan, “Islam is the solution”, as facile.”

What’s all the more puzzling is the attempt it makes to link the Ethiopian Muslim community’s yearlong peaceful protest movement to a decentralized regional command of jihadist terrorists such as the Boko Haram in Nigeria, Ansar Din in Mali, and Al Shabab in Somalia. Still worrisome is the farfetched idea that Ethiopia has the same geography as Afghanistan, Yemen, and Kazakistan, which makes it strategically preferable for waging warfare

No man in his right mind decides to wage a war just because he is allured by the geostrategic location of a country. You need to have a cause and no just cause is to be found amongst Ethiopian Muslims.

During the defendants’ court appearance today, the day after the controversial documentary was broadcast, Ustaz Abubeker Ahmed told the court that the issues the accused protested about and the Muslim committee addressed was their constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of religion.   He argued that their jailors were not ashamed of using torture to coerce confessions, and that following the TV broadcast of the documentary declaring them to be guilty, they don’t expect exoneration from the court.

Before adjournment today, the court reaffirmed that it had issued an injunction order prohibiting the broadcast of the documentary by ETV and that it would demand an explanation from ETV at its court appearance next week.  But the damage is done.

In Ethiopia today, dissidents, whether journalists, academics, political opponents, or Muslims, are considered by the Ethiopian Government to be “terrorists” or are believed to be providing “moral support” to terrorists.  Many have been convicted on trumped-up terrorism charges and are serving prison terms, both long and short. Others are convinced, although not convicted, of the terrorism allegations and expend much effort in staying out of the reach of the federal police. This can be explained in terms of a joke about the man and the corn that Slavoz Zizek loves to tell:

A man is convinced that he is really a grain of corn and is subsequently taken into care. Eventually the therapist in charge of his case is able to convince him that he is really a human being. Satisfied, the man is released but, after only a few minutes, runs back into the building shouting, “there is a chicken outside and he might eat me”. The therapist replies, “but you know you are not a grain of corn”. “Yes,” replies the man, “but does the chicken know?”

That chicken in Ethiopia was former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who bequeathed to all Ethiopians his draconian anti-terrorism legislation.  This legacy is a form of terrorism that Ethiopians are suffering from.  It is also the darkness of authoritarianism.
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Alemayehu Fentaw Weldemariam is a Horn of Africa expert at the LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin, and a visiting scholar at Austin Community College

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በጎ ብቅ ሲልልሽ በግብዝ የሚዋጥብሽ

ጎረምሶች ሲተኙ እናቶች የሚደክሙብሽ

ሰነፎች ሲልቁ ሊቃውንት የሚሰንፉብሽ

የየዋሆች መነኻሪያ

የአምባገኖች ገነት

የቆነጃጅት መፍለቂያ

የጎበዞች እስር ቤት

የንፁህ አየር ፋብሪካ

የክፉ መንፈስ ምክርቤት

ጭቁኖች የሚፈሩሽ ደኾች የሚሸሹሽ

ባህር ማዶ ህይወት ፍለጋ ባህር ውስጥ የሚያልቁብሽ

ጣዕረ ሞታቸው ሌተቀን እዬዬ የሚልብሽ

የፍትህ ትርጉም የጠፋሽ

እውነት ፈፅሞ የራቀሽ

ዕርግማንሽ ስለበዛ

እስቲ እኔ ልመርቅሽ

ቁንጅናሽ ጠውልጎ ጎበዙን ያብዛልሽ

አየርሽ ቆሽሾ ፍትህ ይንፈስብ ሽ

ከቆዳሽ ቀንሶ ነፃነት ያድልሽ

ስምሽ ተቀይሮ እውነት ይጠራብሽ

አሊያማ

ባዕዳን እየጋበዝሽ ልጆችሽን ስታባሪ

ማበብሽ አታሎሽ መርዝ እንዳታፈሪ

ያዋጣኛል ብለሽ ሀቅ ስትቀብሪ

ሀሰት ስታቁሪ ሀሰት ስትቀምሪ

የውሸት ሸለቆ ሆነሽ እንዳትቀሪ

ግርማ ታደሰ

የካቲት 2005

By Faysal Qassim

“Authoritarian leaders do repeat their tactics, once as tragedy, second as farce,” a modified version of Marx’s assertion in his article The Eighteenth Brumaire.

On February 5, the regime in Ethiopia released a documentary film entitled “Jihadawi Harakat”, which was wrongly put as “Jihadic Wars”(haraka is movement in Arabic). The documentary is not very different from the long list of multiple propaganda wars the ruling party has been running for several years. In fact, this film is a bit unlucky to have come after so many of its predecessors which were already dissected and eviscerated by many an observer. I think if at all some of its predecessors were a tragedy in some ways, I think this specific documentary will surely be regarded by too many people as a farce.

Before I move on to the analysis of some aspects of the documentary, I would like to mention some points about this paper. This paper is not a full-fledged work of academics but a collection of some personal reflections on the documentary film, Jihadawi Harekat (hereafter JH). It is not, further, a work of media critique, but a simple set of political analysis about the context of the film and some thematic insights thereof. Finally, although a plenty of sober evidences can be brought up to effectively falsify the many claims of JH, I chose not to in this paper. I will instead just confine myself to showing some of (not all) the internal problems of the documentary vis-à-vis its objectives, without mentioning any external evidence.

Jihadawi Harekat is a second-rate purportedly horror documentary about the growing threat of Islamism in some parts of Africa. It supposedly shows the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, militancy, and terrorism in the wider African continent, with particular emphasis on East Africa. Obviously, the major spotlight is Ethiopia, which is claimed to have become a hotbed of such threats since recent times. The “Islamist crucible”, it is tried to show, has particularly targeted the historic inter-religious co-existence, the intra-religious unity and the development strides of the country.

The “Islamist crucible” is the major message wanted to be sent out. There is nothing new about this fear-mongering. It has been around for more than a year now, at least ever since the current civil rights movement erupted at Awoliya. This special documentary simply forms part of, but a conspicuous part thereof, the long-running alarm sounds going off from the side of the ruling party. And just like the many previous films of its kind (think of Akeldama as an example), it has many long-term and immediate political reasons behind it. It should just be seen like any propaganda work, something any government might be in need of, especially if it is authoritarian.

In a way, any government in the world is bent on propaganda for political survival or promotion. Since a government is not only supposedly the sole collective representative body of a people, but also so in specific ways (i.e., in the philosophies, policies, programmes etc peculiar to it), it should do propaganda in order to sell those peculiarities. Here comes the importance of agency-oriented analysis. Governments, as opposed to the rather abstract concept of the “state” (which is understood to represent the general public in more “inclusive” ways), do (or not do) stuffs and try to convince people of the worth of doing (or the lack thereof) those stuffs.

But democratic governments are in many ways limited in what they can do to create and shape public opinions (at least in many matters that affect people’s lives). There is, for example, a limit to the lie they tell people in public media. There are many reasons for this: 1) While trying to hoodwink their people, politicians in democratic states do know that, depending on the degree and significance of the things they lie about, they are doing this at the risk of losing power (if incumbents) or coming to power (if oppositions) in the coming elections. 2) They also know that it may not be quite easy to get away with one’s misdemeanor due to the high risk of being caught up somewhere in the multiple institutional frameworks of checks and balances. 3) There is, too, a plethora of independent sources of information in the country that would make it quite difficult for politicians to lie and be taken seriously by the wider public 4) Many of these people are also educated and can easily detect the logical or factual (or both) worth of what politicians say. Although it is not correct to assert a necessary relationship between democracy and high rates of education, it is not implausible to argue that most democracies do have higher rates of education, on average, than most non-democracies. All these factors tell us that beguiling people in democracies maybe possible in many occasions, but it is always conducted at the risk of self-beguiling.

The case with the current-day authoritarian governments is starkly different, generally speaking. Authoritarian leaders do need to lie a lot, and usually do so without limits. The significance of telling lies lies in the usual facts that 1) such leaders don’t have much actual credit they can tell about themselves and still can convince a wide array of people in the country 2) stable power, regardless of the type of the regime, never relies only on violence. As many people as possible need to be tricked into supporting these leaders since a government solely hinging on naked violence or the threat of it can’t be quite confident about the durability of its power beyond the not-so-distant future. This assertion is clearly against the one that accords to state violence a conclusive and indefinite guarantee to sustain state rule. The latter assertion, although once argued for by many respected academics and still believed by self-deceiving dictators, has been proven false by both recent political events and political science research.

But it not only the case that authoritarian leaders do need subliminal public deception more than their democratic counterparts. It is also my argument that they have fewer limitations to the amount and degree of the deceptive moves they get involved in. This is mainly because they don’t fear as many negative political consequences for their acts as democratic leaders do. They do not have to lose in elections (even if there is one), nor are they circumscribed by institutional constraints. Add to this the fact that such leaders usually reign over a higher percentage (on average) of illiterate people whom they (the leaders) think are easily manipulable and deceivable.

We can now come back to the EPRDF’s deceptive propaganda machine and insert it into general framework mentioned above. Faced with one of the most formidable—in terms of size, persistence, and public visibility—opposition to its policies, it has to engage itself in massive counter-propaganda. It has to try to shape public opinion in a context where it is standing on its last legs of public legitimacy. The last documentary is one among many others produced to this end. The Muslim rights movement has fearlessly targeted the government’s anti-secularist policies and some of its propaganda institutions, and hence it needs to show, however unconvincingly, that what it claims about the movement is right. No doubt this message is directed to multiple stakeholders in the country’s politics: Christians, Muslims, and Western governments (the last one won’t be dealt with here in this paper). The general idea behind all these messages to all these stakeholders is to divide opinion about the current Muslim activism and solicit further support–moral, political, and financial–for its anti-freedom projects.

Denigrating and soliciting support may be the goal of Jihadawi Harekat, but those factors do not explain the timing. Why would this government choose this time to send across strong messages of the sorts I mentioned above. One reason might have to do with the recently failed attempts at reconciling the two Ethiopian Orthodox Synods and then jointly choosing the new Patriarch. This failure—which is attributed by many people to the interference of the ruling party–has certainly increased the already simmering frustration among many Orthodox Christians whose political consequences might be a source of concern for the EPRDF. The latter might fear that some disgruntled Christians would join the ranks of Muslims in their demand for freedom from government intervention in religious matters. This can be thwarted, the government might think, by diverting the attention of the Christian population towards something that they should be more fearful of. Another reason might have to do with the sharp rise in the size and distribution of demonstrations by Muslims especially since recent times. Especially after the Al Jazeera interview of Prime Minister Hailemariam in which he claimed that the demonstrators are relatively few in number, more numerous people have taken to the streets and compounds of Mosques every Friday. These demonstrations have also spread more widely and forcefully in the regions despite severe crackdown by security forces. So, the government might want to prevent the inclusion of more and more Muslims in the folds of the movement.

The third factor has something to do with the coming elections. It goes without saying that the EPRDF’s record in electoral politics is utterly tragic. But I believe that it has all chances of being more so in the elections to come soon. This is because, I frankly assume, the EPRDF is, more than ever before, ruling over a population whose sympathy for their government has nearly come to a literal end. This will surely force the party to stage an even more unfair electoral process that could ensure its political longevity. But at the same time, it has to try its best to gain the votes of as many people as possible by diverting the attention of the people from their daily sorrows especially in economicl terms. The release of the documentary at this time, therefore, has some apparent electoral benefits, too. These factors, I believe, can help us explain the timing of the documentary.

Let me say more on the specific objectives of the government in broadcasting this documentary now. As the explanations for the timing indicate, the major objectives are forestalling inter-religious and intra-religious alliance/unity, and ensuring “favorable” (to the party in power) electoral climate. The first deals with minimizing the possibility of the forging of a Muslim-Christian (and in a way, Christian-Christian) alliance on the question of religious freedom. With the release of JH, the ruling party might think that the minimization of such a possibility has been achieved in two ways: by demonizing the Muslims’ movement as a “terrorist” or “terrorist-led” one, it is supposed to create abject fear, nevermind a spirit of cooperation, among ordinary Christians. Further, it is also a strong message to any Christians in the country that the shadow of Islamic fundamentalism is currently working in tandem with other secular “terrorist” organizations like the G7. Hence, the government warns, it is important to distance oneself not only from the Muslim activists, but also from all those secular groups that support the activism. This message is especially important when seen in line with two timely facts: the major vocal detractors of what is seen as the government sabotage of Christian-Christian unity are to be found in the diaspora and have been not only oppositional in their general political outlook towards the government but also largely supportive of the Muslim cause. So, the government is in a dire necessity to divorce the Christians inside the country not only from their fellow Muslim citizens but also from their co-religionists in the diaspora at least for some time to come.

Forestalling intra-religious unity is no doubt of foremost importance for the government at this point in time. As the opposition to the government spreads in the regions, there is a possibility that more and more Muslims might be joining the movement or at least sympathizing with it. Thus, the government has to make very clear distinctions between the “Jihadist minority” and the “peaceful majority” in the wider Muslim population. Muslims are, in this way, made to receive the message that it is neither religiously correct, nor politically wise to support the Muslim opposition. It is not the former since the “good” Muslims don’t support Jihadism. It is not the latter because “wise” Muslims care for their lives.

Moreover, the ruling party is also campaigning for elections, so to speak, by releasing this documentary. “I’m protecting”, the EPRDF seems to be telling the dissatisfied electorate (especially the Christians this time around), “the unity, development, and peace of the country from being taken hostage by a bunch of bearded, dangerous Islamic terrorists”. A final goal that has to do with elections is to preclude the potential capitalization, on the part of the Ethiopian opposition parties operating inside the country, on the volatile religious situation in Ethiopia. The opposition parties, it is expected, will be afraid of vocally endorsing the Muslim demands and sympathizing with their sufferings in their (the parties’) attempt at buying votes since the whole Muslim right movement has now been demonized as “Islamist” in goal and terrorist in methodology. As a result, in the eyes of the government, the Muslim activism will be left with no one to insert it into mainstream politics as a legitimate struggle for freedom or make of it a good opportunity for canvassing Muslim votes.

The strategies the documentary employed to achieve these objectives are simple: relate the tale of two apparently separate movements in Ethiopia and make them appear to be closely related. And, by so doing, insert them into global jihad. The first tale is about a person and then a group that both have strong connections with al Shabab, and hence with al Qa’eeda. It is this group that is portrayed as militant and is accused of attempting to commit terrorism in the country. The second tale pertains to the committee members and the rights movement they led/represented. This movement is said to have been orchestrated by two people who have had intellectual connections with a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. These people, it is stated, later on participated in a clandestine group that finally grabbed the Awoliya occasion as an opportunity to realize its dream of establishing an Islamic state.

There are obviously many problems with the way these strategies were put in practice in the documentary. The first and the most obvious one is the question of credibility of the information obtained from the interviews. This question is of utmost importance not just by itself but also for the sake of appreciating the successive points I will make in this paper. But it can be well-illustrated only by using a source outside the documentary. I will, therefore, use, just for this case, few of such sources just to clarify my points.

Both prior and after the broadcast of the JH, proofs of immense torture committed on the detained Muslim rights leaders were leaked. The leaked sources stressed that the torture was used to obtain “evidence”. A file released by Dimsachin Yisema, a facebook group apparently playing a phenomenal leadership role and wide credibility among the Muslim population, two days ago narrated a gruesome and utterly inhumane interrogation processes the committee members underwent in the Maekelawi prison. The file has been duly confirmed as being true and accurate by some other sources, some of them independent. The prominent lawyer of the committee members, Temam Ababulgu, also told different media outlets that the interrogation files were obtained by force. I don’t think, in addition, that we can run short of other evidences to illustrate the atrocious treatment political prisoners and journalist in Ethiopian jails pass through just so they would confess their alleged crimes. We don’t have any good reason to think that a different course of action would be taken with regards to the Muslim prisoners. Hence, I don’t believe any of the “evidences” the government pulled in JH to prove its accusations would be taken seriously by any self-respecting and well-informed observer.

Secondly, and more interestingly, despite the awful prison tortures, the people who led/represented the Muslim right movement apparently don’t appear in the film confessing any of the “evil” deeds or intentions ascribed to them. Not a single one of the three committee members who were interviewed speaks, in a conclusive way, about any alleged intentions on their part of establishing an Islamic state or inciting acts of terrorism. In the trailer released few days before the broadcast of the documentary, the ex-chairman of the committee did appear to have admitted that he/the committee had an intention to establish an Islamic state. But his speech in the actual film made it clear that he is actually referring to the aims of Muslim Brothers, which he never claims to be a member or a supporter of. Another member, Kamil Shemsu, talks of establishing an Islamic state after a couple of decades but his speech is prematurely interrupted. It is not hence clear if he is talking about his intentions or anybody else’s or as to what country he is referring to. The same applies to Yasin Nuru’s incomplete speech.

Another attempt at proving the accusations was connecting the movement with the Muslim Botherhood and specifically with the teachings of Dr Jassim who is claimed to have been a member of the latter organization and whose teachings allegedly aim at bringing about revolutions in the Arab world. But even here, the author of the film failed to demonstrate the charge that the committee members’ actual intention was to bring about the Islamist dreams of some (they differ a lot, by the way) Brotherhood organizations in Ethiopia. While one of the committee members, Kamil, appears claiming that what he learned from Dr Jassim has been used as an input for “what came afterwards”, he also importantly affirms a little latter that he and his friends just sought to enhance Muslim participation in various sectors of life—something quite legal and benign if held as a goal by any citizen. According to the same person, this is also the stated goal of the Monday group, a group whose intentions were presented with suspicious tones in JH. It is really ironic to see that a documentary with a clear objective to denigrate and worked in a safely authoritarian environment ends up severely defeating in its content its very raison d’être.

True, the film later on alleges that the movement took dangerous turns. (Well, this is very much against the widely acclaimed fact about the peacefulness of the demonstrations so far, but I won’t dwell on outside counter-evidences, as I promised). But it is not made clear if those incidents were directed /orchestrated by the committee. To the contrary, some of the speech anecdotes taken from the Muslim representatives before their detention and transmitted in the film clearly indicate that they were unequivocally advocating legal and peaceful means of demanding their rights.

The third, and the most ridiculous, problem was the lack of serious connection between the so-called Shabab-trained group and the Muslim civil right movement. In my view, a sort of connection should have been established between the two in order to easily and justifiably accuse the committee members of terrorism. This is because, as the film indicates, the ruling party apparently couldn’t get all the satisfactory “proof” it wanted from the members—however severe the torture on them to say contrary to their intentions and actions— to establish the existence of an intention or act of terrorism. It got it only from the other group with alleged links to al Shabab. Although it is thus of crucial importance to establish close connection between the two groups, the film failed miserably in doing so. The only time it tried to make connections was when it is claimed that a sadaqa programme in one of the regions was (helped) organized by four members of the “militant” group. But no evidence whatsoever was presented to support this claim (not a single person was interviewed, for instance). The other occasion the Muslim rights movement was mentioned in connection to the “Shabab-informed” group was when the alleged leader of the latter claimed to have considered the Muslim demonstrations as a ripe opportunity for waging jihad. But again it is not at all clear why the committee members or the rights movement should be implicated in this. So, the only method employed by the film-makers in order to help people associate the two otherwise disparate stories is the frequent juxtaposition of their narration and of the pictures of their alleged members. The producers of the film thought that establishing associations in this case can better be dealt with by the art of film direction rather than the science of research findings.

Fourth, that the narrative was terribly biased goes without saying. Just one example suffices: In order to debunk the claim by the Muslim civil right activists that Muslims have currently been severely oppressed, the film showed some three people arguing to the contrary. But the immediate question that comes to mind is: why is the view of three persons more accurate than that of the hundreds of thousands of people who have demonstrated every Friday for the last 12 months (some of the biggest demonstrations were actually transmitted in the film itself)?

Fifth, the cause of the Muslim rights movement has also been largely vindicated. This is mainly represented by the admission of the Mejlis problem. Apart from the acknowledgment of the Mejlis issue as a truly popular one, JH also presented some of the Muslim right leaders speaking in very clear terms about their justifications behind the aspiration for the Mejlis reform. All these justifications and the intended outcomes mentioned were framed in purely religious and social, not political, terms They also explained that many people were upset by the multi-faceted problems of the same institution. The ex-chair of the institution himself appeared in the documentary admitting the incapacity of the organization he formerly headed.

At this juncture, one would certainly wonder what benefits could a government get from a documentary that not only absolved the “suspected terrorists” of any meaningful crime, but also inadvertently vindicated their cause? Doesn’t cheating need a higher form of sophistication that this?

Dictatorial regimes try hard to cheat their people, and there is nothing new about this assertion. But what many people might not have observed is that these regimes actually survive by cheating that they are not cheating. This layered cheating is at the core of the “soft” power of authoritarianism. The problem is when this gets cleared up to the large section of the population. When people start to master the nature and patterns of regime deception, the soft power ceases to be power at all. If the government continues with its propaganda after this—and it surely does—,then the latter will have the only function of self-gratification. If a dictatorial government can’t cheat its people, it will keep cheating itself.

John Vidal | Delhi| The Guardian

Ethiopia‘s leasing of 600,000 hectares (1.5m acres) of prime farmland to Indian companies has led to intimidation, repression, detentions, rapes, beatings, environmental destruction, and the imprisonment of journalists and political objectors, according to a new report.

Research by the US-based Oakland Institute suggests many thousands of Ethiopians are in the process of being relocated or have fled to neighbouring countries after their traditional land has been handed to foreign investors without their consent. The situation is likely to deteriorate further as companies start to gear up their operations and the government persues plans to lease as much as 15% of the land in some regions, says Oakland.

In a flurry of new reports about global “landgrabbing” this week, Oxfam said on Thursday that investors were deliberately targeting the weakest-governed countries to buy cheap land. The 23 least-developed countries of the world account for more than half the thousands of recorded deals completed between 2000 and 2011, it said. Deals involving approximately 200m ha of land are believed to have been negotiated, mostly to the advantage of speculators and often to the detriment of communities, in the last few years.

In what is thought to be one of the first “south-south” demonstrations of concern over land deals, this week Ethiopian activists came to Delhi to urge Indian investors and corporations to stop buying land and to actively prevent human rights abuses being committed by the Ethiopian authorities.

“The Indian government and corporations cannot hide behind the Ethiopian government, which is clearly in violation of human rights laws,” said Anuradha Mittal, director of the Oakland Institute. “Foreign investors must conduct impact assessments to avoid the adverse impacts of their activities.”

Ethiopian activists based in UK and Canada warned Indian investors that their money was at risk. “Foreign investors cannot close their eyes. When people are pushed to the edge they will fight back. No group knows this better than the Indians”, said Obang Metho, head of grassroots social justice movement Solidarity Movement for a New Ethiopia (SMNE), which claims 130,000 supporters in Ethiopia and elsewhere.

Speaking in Delhi, Metho said: “Working with African dictators who are stealing from the people is risky, unsustainable and wrong. We welcome Indian investment but not [this] daylight robbery. These companies should be accountable under Indian law.”

Nyikaw Ochalla, director of the London-based Anywaa Survival Organisation, said: “People are being turned into day labourers doing backbreaking work while living in extreme poverty. The government’s plans … depend on tactics of displacement, increased food insecurity, destitution and destruction of the environment.”

Ochall, who said he was in daily direct contact with communities affected by “landgrabbing” across Ethiopia, said that the relocations would only add to hunger and conflict.

“Communities that have survived by fishing and moving to higher ground to grow maize are being relocated and say they are now becoming dependent on government for food aid. They are saying they will never leave and that the government will have to kill them. I call on the Indian authorities and the public to stop this pillage.”

Karuturi Global, the Indian farm conglomerate and one of the world’s largest rose growers, which has leased 350,000 ha in Gambella province to grow palm oil, cereals maize and biofuel crops for under $1.10 per hectare per year, declined to comment. A spokesman said: “This has nothing to do with us.”

Ethiopia has leased an area the size of France to foreign investors since 2008. Of this, 600,000 ha has been handed on 99-year leases to 10 large Indian companies. Many smaller companies are believed to have also taken long leases. Indian companies are said to be investing about $5bn in Ethiopian farmland, but little is expected to benefit Ethiopia directly. According to Oakland, the companies have been handed generous tax breaks and incentives as well as some of the cheapest land in the world.

The Ethiopian government defended its policies. “Ethiopia needs to develop to fight poverty, increase food supplies and improve livelihoods and is doing so in a sustainable way,” said a spokeswoman for the government in london. She pointed out that 45% of Ethiopia’s 1.14m sq miles of land is arable and only 15% is in use.

The phenomenon of Indian companies “grabbing” land in Africa is an extension of what has happened in the last 30 years in India itself, said Ashish Kothari, author of a new book on the growing reach of Indian businesses.

“In recent years the country has seen a massive transfer of land and natural resources from the rural poor to the wealthy. Around 60m people have been displaced in India by large scale industrial developments. Around 40% of the people affected have been indigenous peoples“, he said.

These include dams, mines, tourist developments, ports, steel plants and massive irrigation schemes.

According to Oakland, the Ethiopian “land rush” is part of a global phenomenon that has seen around 200m ha of land leased or sold to foreign investors in the last three years.

The sales in Africa, Latin America and Asia have been led by farm conglomerates, but are backed by western hedge and pension funds, speculators and universities. Many Middle Eastern governments have backed them with loans and guarantees.

Barbara Stocking, the chief executive of Oxfam, which is holding a day of action against landgrabs on Thursday, called on the World Bank to temporarily freeze all land investments in large scale agriculture to ensure its policies did not encourage landgrabs.

“Poor governance allows investors to secure land quickly and cheaply for profit. Investors seem to be cherry-picking countries with weak rules and regulations because they are easy targets. This can spell disaster for communities if these deals result in their homes and livelihoods being grabbed.”

Oxfam will be placing huge “Sold” signs on the Sydney harbour bridge, the Lincoln memorial in Washington and the Colosseum in Rome to mark

-A Propaganda Video Designed to Deceive and Mislead the Masses

A Statement from Badr Ethiopia

The rules of disinformation dictate that real issues are avoided and side issues are highlighted. Rules and regulations are discarded when convenient; and maintained when subservient. Drama is depicted and truth is restricted. Scary images are projected and information is fabricated. The propaganda machine is selected and coerced statements are extracted. The public is intimidated and fear mongering is initiated. The picture is complete when the government plan is concrete.

The Ethiopian government’s incessant and abusive predatory tactics strike fear into the hearts of its citizens by constantly besmirching and demeaning the peaceful mass movement of Ethiopian Muslims and voraciously attacking the incarcerated Arbitration Committee members. The first part of this dramatic episode was fully revealed yesterday when the grossly distorted video called “Jihadawi Harekat”, which literally means “Jihadi Movement”, aired on national TV in Ethiopia. The government’s production of this scripted and amateurish video drama clearly shows an arrogant attitude and an impenetrable ego. The video camera was slicing and dicing a tapestry of images plucked from different countries and woven together to look whole and one and the same. But the constant movement of the goalpost in the interrogation procedure supports the conclusion that the government’s act of eviscerating the testimony foiled their grand plan. It was evident that the oral utterances of the prejudicially incarcerated Muslims were forcibly extracted under duress for public consumption and self-incrimination. Verbal incoherencies in the statements they gave and some signs of mistreatment were visible on the bodies of the prisoners who might have been subjected to harsh and extrajudicial interrogation techniques to yield false information to the exact specifications of the interrogators and their bosses. The highly dubious nature of their confessions lends credence to their visit of the torture chamber. This was a classic case of misinformation and disinformation campaign. This entails the mantra that the fear of every minority is the majority being in hysteria. The video illustrates vividly that intimidation has overtaken solicitation as the modus operandi of the government. Sadly, the fallout over this video debacle will also have long lasting repercussions for Ethiopia and its citizens.

Fortunately, the fabricated video that doubles as a “Documentary” film was a total fiasco as it produced the opposite effect of the outcome that was expected. The Ethiopian government that has been publicly claiming for some time that it is practicing the rule of law and adhering to democratic principles of governance was caught bare-footed practicing the exact opposite of that principle. This is a watershed moment for the constitution, which is literally being abandoned as a museum piece of erudite collection. The government is embarking on the autocratic method of absolute authority, which has reached fever pitch. Where there is fever, delusion is right behind.

Yesterday’s public airing of the video that was disguised as a “documentary” film has been universally discredited for its premeditated and prefabricated plots. The public showing of the video by the government, which controls all media outlets, seems destined for planting the seeds of hatred and animosity within the Muslim community as well as to create division within the larger Ethiopian population. The official act of publicly demonizing and disparaging the prisoners before their trial in the court of law was highly deceptive and misleading. This demonization tactic also follows the rules of disinformation and suppression of the truth. This method works especially well with a silent press, because the only way the public can learn of the facts is through the rumor mill. The government amplifies the trumped-up charges against the “Prisoners of Conscience”, fabricates it and then feeds it into its propaganda machine to avoid discussion of the real issues of law and order. Therefore, the smear campaign levied against the Arbitration Committee members and other Muslims that are languishing in prison is preposterous and prejudicial and would never see daylight in the common courts of genuinely democratic countries.

To be sure, if this was a real case of terrorism inside Ethiopia or anywhere else for that matter, Badr and all decent Ethiopian Muslims would have been first in line to condemn it and chase it out of town. But those depicted in the crude video are innocent until proven guilty in the court of law. They managed to conduct a very peaceful and exemplary protest against callous infringements on their basic rights to worship freely. They were never a threat to Ethiopia or the government. They were genuine patriots concerned with the condition of their fellow country men and women who were suffocating from the lack of freedom to practice their religion. They also worked hard and were instrumental as partners with the government a few years ago to get it re-elected by the majority of the Muslim population. But these prisoners of conscience instead have become shooting targets for dirty political games. Again, borrowing from the disinformation handbook, one can clearly see that sidetracking protesters or opponents with name calling such as “terrorists” and ridiculing their time-honored mission by calling them “jihadists” smacks of their good record as statesmen and as peaceful negotiators. The video’s disparaging message was designed to make others shrink from supporting them out of fear of gaining the same label, and thus the government gets away with slander once again by avoiding dealing with real issues concerning freedom and worship.

The contents of the film also stem from falsehood and were intended to plant the seeds of division within the Muslims and between the two prominent religious traditions in Ethiopia. This will also damage Ethiopia’s reputation for the time-honored exemplary tolerance and peaceful co-existence between the Christians and the Muslims. In the final analysis, this crude and defamatory film failed to deliver the message that the propagators intended for it. To the contrary, it further alienated the people from the government.
At any rate, Badr Ethiopia strongly denounces and condemns the airing of this video and the fabrication of its contents. The message that Badr would like to send to those infuriated by this video and are upset or distressed at the despicable condition of the Muslim men they saw on the TV screen is: Keep them in your Du’a. This will pass and the truth will bear fruit for their sacrifice. The fabricated video is just a window dresser, which will collapse on its own. Please do not worry, this drama just shows the head wind of a plummeting mass distortion campaign and is a sign of desperation. You can fool some people some time but you cannot fool all the people all the time. Remember to separate the wheat from the chaff. So, was the video a hatchet job or a smear campaign? It will behoove you to catch some points of inflection.

Fabricated videos like managed news are double-edged swords. The smooth edge can entertain by delivering a stage show. But the jagged edge can increase fear and hatred by delivering a scary show. So, which side of the auditorium were you sitting when you watched the video: The imaginary side or the reality side? Please, do not burn the midnight candle to discover the truth.

Experience is what you get when you don’t get what you want. Calamities are a checkbook for the reality of belief.

“An optimist sees an opportunity in every calamity; a pessimist sees a calamity in every opportunity.” - Winston Churchill

–

Badr Ethiopia,
Washington DC

BY MERGA YONAS|The Ethiopian Reporter

As the election for local and the Addis Ababa City Administration is left with less than a few months to go, 28 opposition political parties placed their own reservation before committing themselves to the election. Listing out 18 questions that includes using media, allowing observers and the independence of the NEBE, among the many to make the election fair and free, so far they didn’t receive any response from the electoral board and the PM office. Among the 28 parties, there are prominent parties like Medrek and the newly-emerging Semayawi party. Yilikal Getnet, chairman of Semaywi Party spoke to Merga Yonas of The Reporter on the questions they raised, how they could seize response from the mandated body and what could be the fate of these parties.

Excerpts:

The Reporter: As an opposition political party and and one who has boycotted the upcoming local and Addis Ababa City Administration elections, how do you see the current political atmosphere leading to the election?

Yilikal Getinet: By the way we did not fully boycott  the election. But we are asking the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) about its response to our request on the standards of electoral process, our constitutional right and the electoral law and even in accordance with the international standards. At the minimum level, we are asking to have fair, free and transparent elections. So we are not boycotting the election; rather we have filed 18 questions to the NEBE and the government of Ethiopia. They did not accept our questions and we have not got any response from both entity so far.

Why do you think that is so?

It is better if you ask the incumbent or the election board. Because in the questions we are asking about the media and press law, fairness of the election, how to organize our members, about election observers. So without all this minimum requirements how can we take part in the election. An election is not a one time job, it is a process where the process justifies the end. They are not interested to do that. Even they are violating the law, as the law says the schedule of election can be arranged with the consultation of the stakeholders including the members who held a meeting at Adama to discuss the election mater. Among the 41 members of political parties participating in the meeting, six said that before going into the technical matters with regard to the schedule, they requested to discuss the political matter in the country, including the political landscape the media and some laws that are against the constitution.

The election board accepted the appeal and plan to discuss the matter at first instance. But later, we were informed by the election board public relation officer, Yeshi Fekade, that Prof. Merga Bakana and Dr. Addisu Gebregzihaber have traveled to the US and got some experience from the US elections. So, we were told that when they get back they will discuss the matter and we will hold the meeting.

Could you explain to me the main points in the questions you have filed to the NEBE and the PM’s office and why are they necessary for the upcoming election?

The main one is how to use the public media. Since the inception of our party, for instance, we have undergone a rough path and this is reported by some private and international media outlets. but not by the state owned media for one. So if you don’t take your voice to every media, how could one conduct an election? The second thing is whether the NEBE is free or independent from the government. We are asking as we have doubts on its independence. For instance, Yeshi Fekade, the public relation officer of the NEBE, was a nominee in the 2005 national elections representing the EPRDF and she was also in the armed struggle. We do thus, have substantial evidence and that is what we are asking to be free and fair.

One, including your party and other 28 opposition political parties, could not so far get a responses from NEBE and the PM’s office to your questions, second, these parties didn’t field their candidates and took election signs to take part in the election as its deadline is approaching. So what do you think would be the way forward or remedies to participate in this election?

By the way, we believe the schedule of this election is not the legal schedule. It is illegal. This is what we should underline first. As I mentioned, the schedule can be rearranged with the consultation of stakeholders. So the deadline the NEBE has is not the legal schedule and not according to the law of Ethiopia. I can say this is not an election as it is against the Constitution and election proclamation.

Why do you think other opposition political parties, excluding the 28, didn’t raise the question as you did and put their own reservation?

This question could be very good if you ask parties participating in the election. But I can give you my point of view that these opposition political parties are in the payroll of the EPRDF. This is not something hidden. I can tell you that the weekly newspaper, Sendek, has already published how much salary they get from the EPRDF. There is this party called Selamawi party, an affiliate of EPRDF, gets 20,000 birr from the incumbent. There is a donation from the international community that is meant to improve the  democratization process of Ethiopia and political atmosphere of the country in general. This donation comes through the NEBE, which made some criteria that says the 90 percent of the donation goes to the EPRDF and the rest to the opposition political parties. For instance, Medrek – a front comprising six various parties – was offered just 6000 birr but they didn’t accept that.

If you have substantial evidence for your allegations why didn’t you inform the international community who, you said, are funding in the name of improving democratization?

We informed the international community and we have submitted our plea to the funders on what we are asking for the government and not getting a response. We have written a petition letter to the British Embassy, US Embassy and the UN as well.

If you could not get a response for any of your questions, what do you think is the fate of opposition political parties like yours, for instance, in the 2015 national elections?

It is a very interesting question. I know the political climate in Ethiopia is very difficult and it is deteriorating from time to time, especially since the historical 2005 national election. Since then many laws have been introduced, including the anti-terrorism law, media and press law, civil society law and the land lease law. All this is against the constitution and violates the right of the public. These are not the difficulties the opposition political parties are facing, but for the general public it really is a difficulty. So we are planning to work together with other opposition political parties to solve out our own and the public’s problems. So it is the people who can answer this question.

Recently, Redwan Hussein, head of EPRDF secretariat, said whether these 28 parties take part in the election or not it will not have any loss or benefit for the EPRDF though their participation is good. How do you react to his statement?

It is really a pity to hear such a comment from a government official. For one thing, what EPRDF lacks is a moral integrity, ethics and principles to lead a nation. When you are in a public life, they see you not only as a government official but as a figure and model personality. So how could one say the lack of opposition political parties in the political atmosphere is meaningless and it doesn’t have any impact on the EPRDF or the election process for that matter. So this is really EPRDF’s discordant policy.

By Mesfine Negash

I have very little to add on what has been said against the latest government propaganda piece broadcasted on ETV. I deliberately decided not to comment on the production, content and message of the film. There is nothing new in the substance. However, I have no words to express how heart breaking is to watch those fellow citizens- who had the right to be considered innocent- incriminating themselves under duress. How painful and humiliating the oppressors want to make each and every step of this brutal treatment! And they film it probably because they enjoy what they do.

What could have happened to these people when and where there was no camera?!

I imagined…imagined… tried to connect to what had happened to one of my dear friends…., and found myself short of words. Instead, I decided to “defend” ETV and the oppressors.

Dear Oppressors,

Good job, keep on recording at least half of your crimes, that is part of our collective memory. The only thing I like about your court drama is this aspect of recording your history of injustice and the crime you are committing in the name of justice.

Keep it up, Show a glimpse of your crime to the public once in a while so that we don’t forget the state of affair we are living in.

Appreciated, if you make the coverage more diverse in terms of regional distribution and type of “perpetrators/ terrorists,” as they are from all ethnic groups, religions, and walks of life. You may dedicate one separate revolutionary democratic tv/radio channel for your recorded crimes.

Thank you, for waking up some delusional and naïve hypocrites who think of you otherwise.

Indebted for reminding us what kind of leaders and government we have.

Grateful, you have given everyone of us a compelling moment to imagine ourselves in the shoe of those under your vengeful, inhuman and despicable treatment. I cannot name all of them here; after all, I know very few of them by name.

Long live to Revolutionary-Democractic justice!

In loving memory of your dead leader,

Yours, critically

By Merga Yonas|The Reporter

The lawyer of twenty-nine Muslim defendants, who are in prison on charges of terrorism, is to sue the Ethiopian government and Ethiopian Radio and Television Agency (ERTA), following the latter’s broadcast of a documentary portraying the defendants as terrorists. After a week of public announcement, ERTA aired a documentary titled “Jihadawi Harekat” (Jihadic Movement) on Tuesday. The documentary was produced by the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) and the Federal Police in collaboration with ERTA.

Though the government of Ethiopia claims that it has ample evidence demonstrations the defendants’ involvement in terror acts, which the documentary attempted to show, part of the public are unconvinced by the content of the documentary.

The lawyer of the defendants, Temama Ababulgu, told The Reporter that the documentary was banned from airing by the Fourth Criminal Bench of the Federal High Court. However, ERTA disregarded the injunction.

He went on to say that though the Ethiopian government is duty bound to protect the rights of citizen, it has inflicted a moral damage on the defendants, their families and the general public.

Temam added that since the documentary run despite a court order, he will sue the Ethiopian government, namely the NISS and Federal Police, as well as ERTA.
The defendants were charged with terrorism offenses in October of last year. Nine members of a 17-person committee was formed to seek a solution to the grievance sparked by the Al Ahbash controversy. The were charged under the 2009 anti-terrorism law.

Since their arrest, part of the Ethiopian Muslim community in Ethiopia has been holding protests at mosques calling for their release.

The government accuses the group of being led by extremists who want to convert the secular nation into an Islamic state.

Editor’s note

I wonder what impact this decision might have on the vital development work, particularly in education and health, that the Mekane Yesus church undertakes I hope the current leadership of the Church has given sufficient reflection and strategic assessment before severing a relationship that was built through handwork and sacrifices of predecessors such as Gudina Tumsa and Emanuel Abraham.

ELCA NEWS SERVICE
February 7, 2013

Lutheran church in Ethiopia severs relationship with ELCA
13-8-MRC

CHICAGO (ELCA) — The Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus is severing its relationship with the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA), the Church of Sweden and “those churches who have openly accepted same-sex marriage.”

The action for “all Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus departments and institutions (at every level) to implement this decision” was ratified at the denomination’s general assembly, which met Jan. 27-Feb. 2 in Addis Ababa. The denomination’s church council took action at its July 2012 meeting to initially sever these relationships.

“The ELCA is very saddened by this decision,” said the Rev. Rafael Malpica Padilla, executive director for ELCA Global Mission. “The ELCA and its predecessor church bodies have been walking with the people of Ethiopia for more than 50 years, and our sister church, the Church of Sweden, for more than 150 years. In this journey, we have learned from one another, we have deepened and extended the bonds of fellowship and partnership in the gospel.” Malpica Padilla was in Addis Ababa for meetings with program and ministry partners of the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus.

To ensure that the decisions by the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus are implemented, members of the denomination “will not receive Holy Communion from the leadership and pastors of the (ELCA and the Church of Sweden). The Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus will not distribute communion to these churches,” as stated in the minutes of the denomination’s July 2012 council meeting.

“Representatives of these churches at national level or leaders at every level would not be invited to preach or speak at the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus congregations or other gatherings. They should not be invited for any spiritual ministries of this church,” stated the minutes, which also reflects that leaders and pastors of the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus “at every level will not visit the synods, dioceses, congregations and national offices of churches that have accepted this practice without proper permission from the head office of the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus.”

While the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus is “closing the door to this partnership,” Malpica Padilla said that the ELCA and the Church of Sweden “are not locking the doors from our side. It is open for when you decide it is time to resume this journey together. It is my hope that in the near future, we will again walk together in Christian love. We will do this not because of doctrinal agreements or consensus, but because the gospel compels us to do so.”

The ELCA has consistently kept its Lutheran companion churches informed about the ELCA’s process that led to the 2009 ELCA Churchwide Assembly decisions, which included the adoption of a social statement on human sexuality, said Malpica Padilla.

“We shared the study documents and invited their input,” he said. “When decisions were made, we wrote to (leaders of the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus) expressing our commitment to not impose our actions and to respect the policy and practice of the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus in the assignment of mission personnel,” he said.

The Rev. Mark S. Hanson, ELCA presiding bishop, said the actions of the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus are “deeply troubling.”

“Our own statement on human sexuality acknowledges that the position held by the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus is also held by members of the ELCA. We are not of one mind, but we are one in Christ, in faith and in baptism,” said Hanson, adding that the relationships between Lutherans in North America and in Ethiopia “has been sustained through periods of oppression, divisions within the Ethiopian church and in times of turmoil among Lutherans in North America. The action of the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus church diminishes our capacity together to proclaim the good news of Jesus Christ, to serve our neighbors and to care for the creation.

“As the ELCA, we are always standing ready to open the door of conversation for the sake of reconciliation and our shared commitment to proclamation and service,” Hanson said. “Reconciliation is not an option. It is given in Christ, and we stand ready to engage with the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus on what this gift of reconciliation might mean for us now.”

- – -
About the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America:
The ELCA is one of the largest Christian denominations in the United States, with more than 4 million members in nearly 10,000 congregations across the 50 states and in the Caribbean region. Known as the church of “God’s work. Our hands,” the ELCA emphasizes the saving grace of God through faith in Jesus Christ, unity among Christians and service in the world. The ELCA’s roots are in the writings of the German church reformer, Martin Luther.

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Also news from the Swedish side (Source: http://www.dagen.se/nyheter/mekane-yesus-kyrkan-bryter-med-svenska-kyrkan/)

Mekane Yesus Church breaks with the Swedish Church

Swedish church’s decision to approve same-sex marriage became too much. Now select Mekane Yesus Church in Ethiopia to stop the long-standing cooperation.

The formal decision, which covers all the churches that have approved same-sex marriage, was established as the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America by Mekane Yesus Church of the General Assembly in January / February. Swedish Church and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in the United States specifically singled out as a deterrent.

“Representatives from the churches at the national level and leaders at every level should not be invited to preach or speak in Mekane Yesus-church congregations or other collections. They should not be invited to any spiritual activity in this church,” it was said when Mekane Yesus-Church Board met in July last year.

General Assembly decision confirms the board decided in July, when it is also stated that leaders and pastors in Mekane Yesus Church “at every level not to visit the synods, dioceses, congregations and national offices of the churches that have accepted this (gay marriage) without sufficient approval from Mekane Yesus-Church headquarters. ”

With the General Assembly’s decision also canceled all forms of giving and taking of communion between the churches’ representatives and members.

Mekane Yesus Church originated in Evangelical Foundation’s mission work in Ethiopia and has historically had good relations with the ETUC and the Swedish Church.

By William Davison - Feb 11, 2013| Bloomberg

Ethiopia’s government plans to attract more foreign investment and boost domestic savings as it struggles to finance infrastructure and other development projects, State Minister of Finance Abraham Tekeste said.

The government is seeking “concessional loans” from development banks for roads and power lines and is “aggressively promoting” investment from Europe and the Middle East, Abraham said in an interview in the capital, Addis Ababa. Natural resources, improving infrastructure and cheap labor and power mean there are “bankable” opportunities in areas such as chemicals and agro-processing, he said.

Africa’s second-most populous nation plans to spend 144 billion birr ($7.8 billion) developing its economy this fiscal year as part of a five-year plan that ends in mid-2015. Investments are to be made in rail, power, sugar, roads and housing projects as Ethiopia seeks to become an industrialized middle-income nation by 2025.

“Finance has become a challenge,” Abraham said on Feb. 8. “As we intensify implementation of the plan, finance is increasingly becoming a critical constraint.”

Growth in sub-Saharan Africa’s fourth-biggest economy slowed to 8.5 percent in the 12 months to July 7, the end of Ethiopia’s fiscal year, from 11.4 percent a year earlier, as agricultural productivity gains slowed, Abraham said. The expansion is expected to accelerate to more than 10 percent this year as investment in farming boosts output, he said. The International Monetary Fund projects growth will be 6.5 percent.

Plan ‘Rethink’

The government has been urged by the IMF to “rethink” its infrastructure investments and modify a requirement that commercial banks buy central-bank securities equivalent to 27 percent of the loans to help fund development projects. The Washington-based lender also advised the government to raise official interest rates, which are currently at about 5 percent.

Demand for credit from public enterprises is crimping private industry and an inflation rate well above lending rates is discouraging saving, the IMF said in October. Annual inflation slowed to 12.5 percent in January from 12.9 percent the month before, according to the country’s statistics agency.

The government will conduct a mid-term review of the five- year growth plan at the end of this fiscal year, Abraham said. Projects that boost business, such as a railway that links Addis Ababa to Djibouti, the country’s main trade route, and hydropower dams, will be prioritized, he said.

China, India

The Export-Import Bank of China loaned Ethiopia $475 million for railways in June, according to Finance Ministry data. The government is also discussing advances with India and other countries for the project, Abraham said.

While the country experienced a surge in demand for foreign exchange due to “uncertainty” at the time of former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s illness and death in August, the central bank’s reserves haven’t dropped below the “critical level” of covering three months’ worth of imports, Abraham said. Ethiopia’s trade deficit was $7.5 billion last year.

Ethiopia’s national savings rate as a proportion of gross domestic product increased to 16.5 percent from 12.8 percent last year as business saved for investment, bank branches were opened, people were educated about the benefits of saving and new instruments were offered, including bonds to fund what will be Africa’s largest hydropower project, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Abraham said.

To contact the reporter on this story: William Davison in Addis Ababa atwdavison3@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story: Antony Sguazzin at asguazzin@bloomberg.net

By Jilcha Hamid

(Read Part I, Part II, Part III, Part IV, Part V)

I packed a bag, assembled the squad and we hit the road east of Dirre Dhawa. We spent a few days in the town of Malka Raafuu before heading out to villages where other relatives were expecting us. Although the area was usually fertile, there were water shortages due to persistent drought. It hadn’t rained in quite a while. Nonetheless it was a beautiful town, surrounded by green hills and interestingly enough we arrived just as it began raining. Unfortunately I made the mistake of leaving my jacket behind. The ground was damp, and would get rather muddy as the rains continued for several days. Droughts, followed by heavy rains and occasional floods was the cycle. Global warming, climate change, whatever you wanna call it, people were just happy to see the rain again. Until the rains got a little too heavy.

“You brought the rain with you!” joked some relatives as we settled down and family and guests arrived. It was cloudy outside so the room was pretty dark. With the sounds of bags being opened and bundles hitting the ground, you knew it was barcaa time. Entered a well kempt, chubby, light-skinned man with a pistol on his waist. In Africa chubbiness is a good thing. Being thin like myself on the other hand, was an undesirable trait. A sign of poverty apparently. The man was the district commissioner. He was polite, well mannered, and seemed to be well liked by locals. People were jumping over one another to take pictures with him and shake his hand. He spoke about government plans, development goals, anniversaries etc….politician stuff.

“We are happy that you were able to be here to commemorate the downfall of the flesh eating naftanya, and we invite you to take part in the ongoing development projects.”

It was brought to his attention that locals were still lobbying the administration to drill for water particularly in the rural mountainous areas of the district, but the administration said that it would take time. They first needed to fix the roads, in order to bring in the supplies to drill the well. But nothing was being done about the roads. The administration said that they didn’t have the funds.

He asked us to watch TV Oromiya, the television station of the regional government, and would constantly bring our attention to what was going on on the screen.

“Look, look at this man! This is the director of Oromiya’s bureau of ‘such and such’, listen to what he’s saying! And this man as well, he is a very important person!” What can I say, the man was really enthusiastic about his party. ‘The Cadre’ (if you remember him) who had tagged along from Dirre Dhawa, took the opportunity to forward his resume and do a bit of socializing with the governor and other local officials. He told them about his experience  and his connections in the Dirre Dhawa administration, and in an effort to impress his counterparts with how well connected he was, he began spilling the beans and airing all the dirty laundry of the Dirre Dhawa administration. It was safe to say that for this reason, he didn’t get the job.

After a few days in town we headed out to the countryside. We travelled north along the bumpy roads to a rocky, mountainous area of the district. The area which had been most affected by drought. As I looked at the mountainous settlement I thought to myself, the forefathers must have been some tough people to have settled here. The village was actually just families living spread out in the mountains. During the previous regimes villagization campaign all the locals were forcibly moved and placed in settlements closer together, so that the regime could keep an eye on them, but after the downfall of the regime the villagers went back to their original homes. Economically it was an agricultural region. In better days locals used to make a good profit from exporting their goods via contraband, which has now ceased.

There was so much history in these hills. It was here that my Grandfather was buried, during the Ethio-Somali war. A couple of kilometers over the mountains my other Grandfather was also buried, killed by the Ethiopian army. After the Somali army retreated from the area in ‘78, the criminal Derg junta went on a rampage killing and laying waste to everything in their path because the locals, they claimed, had supported the Somali army. Eventually that regime went into the dust bin of history.

When the regime of Mengistu fell, the area fell under OLF administration. When the OLF leadership went into exile and the organization went underground, the EPRDF moved into the area and a local militia made up of former OLF recruits regrouped and based itself in the mountains from where they would launch attacks on the nearby EPRDF base. During the day the EPRDF would patrol the villages and try to gather information from locals about rebel activity. Meanwhile the rebels would send scouts to monitor the EPRDF patrols and keep note of which villagers were speaking with them. When the evening came the EPRDF would return to their base and the rebels would come down to the villages to get supplies and warn those seen speaking with the EPRDF. By sunrise the rebels went back to their bases and the EPRDF patrol would return to inquire about rebel activities. This situation continued for several years until it reached it’s peak in 1995. Some influential locals turned up brutally executed followed by the killing of an elderly woman by unknown gunmen. The EPRDF saw the opportunity to move in and guarantee influential people protection in exchange for their support. Local leaders in an effort to avenge those who had been killed put the blame on the rebels, and rallied locals to form a militia of their own to dislodge the rebels. Which is eventually what happened. Although many years passed, the bloodshed and loss of loved ones was fresh in many people’s memories.

“Both sides claimed that they were fighting for us. Whether they claimed to be fighting for our freedom or for our protection, if we asked either of them to leave, they would never listen.” said one of the villagers. In such a remote region, far from the worlds eyes, their community was all they had. There was no international media to tell their story or NGO to speak for them and address their concerns. Armies and administrations came and went. They only had one another, and they did what they felt was necessary to survive. But it was easy to see that they all longed for something better.